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Abstract—The number of unsolicited, advertisement calls
(Termed as Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT)) and messages
on a typical telephony system has increased at an alarming
pace. Every year, the telecommunication regulator, law enforce-
ment agencies and telecommunication service providers receive
a large number of complaints from users pertaining to these
unsolicited, unwanted calls. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
infrastructure is the preferred platform of choice for spammers
to make these unwanted calls, primarily due to the cheap calling
rate and easy integration. In this paper, we propose, design,
and develop a novel detection system for unwanted calls in a
telephone system, by considering the social behavior of user
towards their friends, relatives, and family members. In our
design, the reputation of each caller is computed by modeling
the call-rate, call duration and a number of partners associated
with each caller. Such information are collected from the call
detailed records. Once the reputation of the caller is computed,
the next step is to group the callers into spam and non-spam
clusters, based on global reputation scores. The performance
of the proposed approach is measured using synthetic dataset
that has been generated by simulating the social behavior of
spammers and non-spammers. The evaluation results show that
our proposed approach is highly effective in detecting spam
activities, with only 2% false positive rate under heavy and
moderate SPIT attack. Additionally, the proposed approach
does not require any change in the underlying VoIP network
architecture, and it does not introduce any additional signalling
delay.
Index Terms—SPIT, Trust, Reputation, VoIP, Network Oper-
ations
I. INTRODUCTION
Unwanted phone calls and text messages can come at any
hour of the day. They annoy people at work, disturb them
in their family time, and even can wake them up from sound
sleep during the night. Recent statistics on the telephony spam
reveal that answering spam calls can result in an estimated
waste of 20 million man hours for small businesses in the
United States with the annual loss of about $475 million [1].
Every year service providers, regulators, and law enforcement
agencies receive thousands of complaints from consumers
of the technology for these unsolicited, unauthorized, and
fraudulent callers trying to abuse them. In 2012, USA FTC
(Federal Trade Communication) received four times more
complaints against unwanted calls than those in 2010 [2]. The
number of identified spam callers has also risen to 162% from
January 2013 to January 2014.
VoIP affordable calling rates, rich value added services
and easy integration with the IP technologies has created an
opportunity for the spammers and telemarketers to exploit the
VoIP medium for unwanted, bulk un-solicited calls referred to
as SPam over Internet Telephony (SPIT). Spammers normally
make spam calls for advertising products, harassing sub-
scribers, convincing subscribers to dial a premium numbers,
making Vishing(voice equivalent of web Phishing) attack to
recipient’s private information, etc. Spammers can also attempt
to steal user’s information [3], make calls to check unsecure
gateways within the network for the termination of bulk un-
billed calls [4], and cause disruption in network services
through flooding and denial of service attacks [5], [6].
Several approaches have been designed for combating the
SPIT callers in a VoIP telephony and are mainly grouped
into followings categories: a) content-based approaches that
processes the speech signals on fly and blocks callers having
spam content [7], [8], [9], [10], b) a list-based approaches that
maintains a black, white, and grey list of callers classified as
having spamming and non-spamming behavior [11],[12] c) a
Turing and CAPTCHA test based approaches that ask caller
to solve the challenge [13], [14], [15], [15], [16], and d) a
reputation-based system that computes reputation of the caller
by getting feedback from the callee or uses information from
the call detail records (CDRs) [17] [18].
The installation of these existing spam detection systems
in a real voice network has some concerns. The user privacy
concerns, real-time processing of speech signals, encrypted
speech contents, and legal issues limit the use of content
processing to be used for combating spammers. The inspection
of packet headers can be useful to infer the SPIT caller;
however, in a VoIP network, the packet headers of legitimate
and non-legitimate callers are same and do not provide any
valued information to be used for classifying caller as a
spammer and a non-spammer. The black and white list may
control the spamming activity but has limitations as in VoIP
it is easy to spoof legitimate callers identities. The complex
Turing or CAPTCHA test can be difficult to be solved by
the ordinary caller and spammer in a real-time voice network
but it require sophisticated system and network resources for
handling a large number of concurrent calls.
Mostly telephony users develop a social relationship and
trust network with other users. As the user establishes more
and more links (incoming and outgoing) with others, his
social network grows and develops different level of trust
with their interacted persons over the time. Legitimate user
normally communicate within their circle of friendship and
family member thus exhibits repetitive and reciprocated calling
behavior. On the other hand, spammers exploit telephony for
financial gain and betraying users with the fraud thus always
target large number of subscribers which results in his non-
connected social network. The social network behavior of
legitimate and non-legitimate callers discloses some interesting
patterns that can be used for distinguishing spammer from the
non-spammers. The existing social network based anti-SPIT
systems mainly uses in and out-degree distribution, clustering
coefficient, reciprocity etc. for blocking the spammers. How-
ever, in a voice network other features such as call duration
and call rate of the caller could also provides additional
information that can characterize the behavior of the caller
across the network.
In this paper, we describe and evaluate a new approach
that uses number of social network features for blocking
SPIT caller in a VoIP network. The approach classifies caller
as a spammer or non-spammers in two steps: first a global
reputation is computed from caller’s call rate with his callees,
duration of calls with his callees and out-degree of the caller.
Secondly, a dynamic threshold is computed using unsupervised
machine learning approach that classifies caller as a spammers
and a non-spammers. The central procedure of our approach
is to create a weighted social network of the caller, compute
his reputation score within the network and classify him as
a SPIT or a non-SPIT. We evaluate the performance of pro-
posed approach using synthetic data-set for different network
conditions and for different percentages of spammers and non-
spammer.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II briefly de-
scribes SPIT attack in a VoIP network. Section III includes
review of work from the other researchers in this field. Section
IV provides motivation for our approach for SPIT detection. In
section V we present the features used for distinguishing SPIT
caller from the non-SPIT caller and illustrate the computation
of trust and reputation. The experimental setup is presented in
section VI and detailed evaluation for different performance
metric is presented in section VII. The paper concludes with
some thoughts about the future work in section VIII.
II. SPAM OVER INTERNET TELEPHONY
Voice spam or SPIT (Spam over Internet Telephony) are
unwanted, unsolicited, pre-recorded advertisement phone calls
intended to be delivered to a large number of recipients
through the use of VoIP based telephony system by a spam
sender that has no prior social relationship with the recipients.
In the USA, during fiscal year 2012, the FTC recorded
3,840,572 consumer complaints about unwanted telemarketing
calls [19] which are four times of complaints received in 2010.
VoIP spammers are similar to email spammers as both have
the same intent of delivering information to the recipients that
contains advertisements of legal or illegal products, defraud
end-users by getting private information, and spread viruses.
The spam calls and messages can also be sent to and from
mobile systems and the legacy PSTN telephony. The following
are additional forms of spam introduced because of VoIP
telephony:
Instant Message Spam: Bulk unsolicited instant messages
(similar to email spam messages) but sent instantly to users of
messaging system like Skype [20], WhatsApp, and Viber etc.
Presence Spam: Presence spam is bulk unsolicited set
of presence requests messages to subscriber in order to get
recipients buddy or white list for sending IM or call spam.
Virus Spam: Sending viruses inside bulk SMS or IM
messages that affects operating system of VoIP phones and
discloses system vulnerabilities to spammers.
A. SPIT Differences from E-mail Spam
SPIT exhibits some similarity with the email spam. Both
email spammer and SPIT caller use Internet as medium for
conveying messages but SPIT causes serious discomfort to
the victims of the spam call because of real time response
for the call. Besides similarity in motivations and medium,
SPIT exhibits some differences from email spam with re-
spect to spam victims and service providers. E-mail spammer
utilizes text messages, images or attachments for convening
their message to victims, whereas SPIT callers use digitized
speech streams over Internet for conveying their messages. In
terms of deciding about sender or contents, the email service
provider can hold e-mails for some time period before finally
delivering them to the recipient inbox, which is not noticeable
to recipients. The VoIP or Voice service provider cannot hold
speech stream and signalling messages without addition of
noticeable delay in signalling and flow of speech streams
between users. From the perspective of content processing,
online processing of speech content is more challenging and
resource intensive than offline processing of text messages and
images.
From a user’s perspective, a single e-mail spam can remain
in the inbox unattended for as much time as the user wishes,
but in the case of SPIT or voice call user has to respond back
interactively, which makes it more annoying and disturbing.
With respect to user’s resource consumption, a single spam
email typically consumes small number of bytes, but a voice
message in a voice mail box requires greater space thus
making voice mail box unavailable to the legitimate callers.
In terms of human effort, the deletion of a SPIT call is more
annoying and intrusive than the deletion of spam emails. In
email network, the service provider assists end-users in classi-
fying senders. Furthermore, end-users can assess legitimacy of
an email by careful inspection of the subject line or the email
header. On the other hand, telephony requires a user to listen to
the recorded call before making a decision about its legitimacy.
Moreover, there exists no system that allows service providers
to provide information to callee about the nature of calls
recorded in the voice mail box. Additionally, in telephony, the
user might also delete some important calls if he is making
decision without appropriate inspection or attention to the call.
In the perspective of protocol architecture, an E-mail message
is composed of two parts: header and body. The email header
part can provide information about sender’s nature. Telephony
calls also consists of two parts: signalling and speech streams;
but the signalling message though available in plain text but
is not providing any information about the sender’s nature and
the speech stream is only available after the call setup.
III. SPIT MITIGATION SCHEMES
Several approaches have been devised for mitigating spam-
mers in the network. The SPIT detection systems can be
grouped in two categories: content-based detection systems
and identity-based spam detection systems. The content-based
detection systems process the speech streams exchanged be-
tween sender and recipient using machine learning mechanism
while the identity-based detection systems use identity of users
(caller identity or IP-address) for monitoring the behavior of
users within the network. This section provides an overview
of prior works that have been carried out for countering
spammers in a voice network.
A. Content-Based Approaches
SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) and RTP (Real Time Pro-
tocol) are a widely used for call setup and exchange of voice
among users. The content-based approaches analyze either
semantics of SIP signaling messages, or RTP contents in a
real and a non-real time [7], [8], [9], [10]. The content-based
approaches require advanced signal processing for speech
content analysis, updated voice data-set for pattern matching.
These techniques are vulnerable, when the SPIT callers in-
telligently change text to voice script with added noise or
random text. The content-based approaches also results in
a degraded voice quality, because of delay due to speech
processing and also bypass user privacy. The text contents of
initial call setup message of the legitimate and SPIT callers are
same, thus cannot provide valuable information to distinguish
a SPIT from a non-SPIT caller. The subject line of a SIP invite
message may provide some information, but mostly in a real
VoIP network the caller does not provide any information in
the subject line, or the SPIT caller may use legitimate text in
the subject line.
B. Access List-Based Approaches
Access list-based approaches compare the identities of a
caller and a callee with the local and global black or white
lists. A blacklist specifies who is to be kept out allowing all
others to pass. A white-list only allows those who are already
in the list to get through. Both of these techniques require
continuous update of white and black listed users. Besides,
white and black list, a gray list [11],[12] can also be used,
which contains the list of callers those should be blocked on
their first attempt and later allowed if a second attempt is
made within a specific time window. The gray list increase
the number of attempts to reach the callee. The list-based
approaches are usually implemented in combination with
other approaches [21], [22], [23].
C. Challenge-Response Based Approaches
The SPIT callers can be a human or a machine. The Turing
tests, is a technique adopted from e-mail and depends on
the fact that some things are easy for humans, but almost
impossible for computers. The callers are authorized to make
calls via their private-public key exchange or Turing test
authentication [13], [14], [15]. The human conversation has
short pause time at the beginning of an answered call followed
by the statement by the callee that initiates the conversation.
The overlap in a conversation patterns may consider that
the caller is automated SPIT caller. These communication
patterns have been analyzed in [15] and hidden Turing tests is
proposed for identification of SPIT caller. A trust enforcement
mechanism [16] allow caller to solve complex puzzles for
generating new identities to be used for making calls using new
identities. The Turing test approaches may be successful in
blocking computer generated SPIT calls but it would consume
more network resources. Solving puzzles increase the call
setup time and put extra burden on legitimate caller to solve
puzzles for every call attempt.
D. Imposing Cost on Caller
The Payments at Risk based approach [24] deducts some
money from the caller account, and returns back if the caller
is found legitimate at later stage. This feature is desirable
because it preserves the ability of any legitimate caller to reach
a large number of callee at low cost. Otherwise, users who
send a large amount of wanted communication are subject to
prohibitively high fees, thereby reducing the usefulness of the
communication medium. The cost based approaches require
an extensive micro payment infrastructure, which seems im-
practical.
E. Extended Call-Setup Based Approaches
Call-Setup [25] based approaches work in the following
way: they accept call from the caller, disconnect it and call
back caller for the call. The limitation with this technique is
that it requires extra hardware or software resources and also
increase the call setup time.
F. Social Reputation-Based Approaches
Social reputation based approaches use social relationship
between the caller and a callee to rank caller’s reputation.
The trust values provide caller-callee direct trust, and the
global reputation provides caller reputation as a whole in a
network. The trust among users help achieving personalized
detection, and global reputation is useful as a callee typically
does not receive calls from all callers, and rely on the feedback
from their friends or other users. In VoIP, the direct trust and
global reputation can be computed in two ways: using callee
feedback, or past communication pattern of the caller. The
reputation of caller can be computed from the average call
duration [17], the number of short and long duration calls
[24], social network properties such as: node degree, local
clustering coefficient, in-count, out-count, reciprocity index
etc. The callee can also be asked for providing the positive
or negative feedback about the callers [21], [22], [26], [27],
[28].
In [17], a direct trust is computed from average call duration
and global reputation is computed using Eigen trust reputation
algorithm. The higher the average call duration greater the
trust a callee has on a caller, and reputed the caller is. The
semi-supervised clustering has been applied to callee feedback
and SIP messages for clustering legitimate and non-legitimate
callers [26],but it require user feedback and changes in VoIP
phones. In [21], [22] a multi-stage SPIT detection system
has been presented; which is based on trust and reputation of
caller, and feedback about callers from other filters like black
and white list. The trust is computed by getting direct feedback
from the callee and the caller’s reputation is computed using
Bayesian inference function. The reputation base techniques
can also be applied in combination with other SPIT detection
approaches [24], [29], which are multistage and interact with
other stages for final decision about the caller.
There are few approaches which build their filters on the
basis of call duration between the caller and the callee. In [18],
three system has been proposed for identifying SPIT caller
in a large VoIP operator. The solutions utilize average call
duration along with the page-rank algorithm for identifying
possible SPIT caller. It is possible that the Spam callers make
groups for SPIT attack. In [27], [28] two system has been
proposed for thwarting SPIT caller by utilizing individual and
group level call duration. The first system applied Mahalanobis
distance to the caller call duration and time of call for
distinguishing individual SPIT caller from non-SPIT callers.
The second system uses entropy of the call duration at caller
group level for detecting misbehaving group.
A provider level reputation system has been proposed in
[30], in which the destination operator assigns reputation
to caller home operator. The system enables SIP receiving
operator to assign reputation score to SIP source operator
by analysing the tags assigned by the source operator to
the destination operator. IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) has
been adopted for voice communication in next generation
wireless network and is vulnerable to unwanted calls. In the
case of IMS, the protection may be referred to as Protection
against Unsolicited Communication (UC) in an (IMS) (PUCI)
[31].In [32] a collaborative scorecard framework is provided
for discriminating legitimate caller from the non-legitimate
in an IMS network. The scores card of caller is sent to
receiving domain, which built its decision whether to allow
or deny caller from calling the callee in a receiving domain.
The transit operator provides services for terminating VoIP
traffic to specific country. In [29], a multistage SPIT detection
system has been proposed and analyzed for different call rate.
The system uses feedback among various stages for detecting
SPIT caller in a transit VoIP operator.
G. Reputation System in Other Domains
Several approaches have been proposed for computing rep-
utation and trust of user in other domains like P2P network,
e-commerce etc. In [33], authors present a distributed trust
model for computing the trust of user involved in online
transactions. In [34], authors present system for computation
of trust for classifying users or agents as legitimate or non-
legitimate. From the perspective of email network, in [35],
authors propose a method for computation of reputation of
the email user based on past transactions of email user. In
[36], authors presented a link prediction approach that uses
the overall structure of the social graph for predicting link
between two entities.
All of above mentioned systems are attempted to classify
user as legitimate or non-legitimate based on connectivity
network. They are only considering the feedback from the
user for the other interacted users. These proposed approaches
cannot be directly used for blocking spammers in a real-
time VoIP medium as in VoIP and telephony, user behavior
is continuously changing and can be modeled using some
additional features such as duration of interaction, number of
time users interacted with other, number of mutual connections
etc.
IV. DISCUSSION AND MOTIVATION
The real-time nature of VoIP requires that the SPIT callers
should be refraining from calling during the call setup phase
rather than examining the speech contents after the call setup.
The detection of SPIT during the call setup phase not only
improves customer satisfaction but also improve resource
utilization. The real challenge in design of any SPIT detection
system is to block a spam caller before the telephone rings
without user involvement or content analysis. The content-
based SPIT detection poses many challenges as it require re-
sources for speech recognition, a speech data-set of spammers
and non-spammers for real time decision, may be difficult to
be applied to encrypted speech and is against the user data
protection legislation. The list-based approaches need lot of
maintenance and update, when calls are received from many
different sources. The reputation based approaches built their
filter by either getting feedback from the callee or uses average
call duration, but they rely on callee for making final decision
about accepting or rejecting the call.
The high average call duration is the sign of strong rela-
tionship [17], but trust between caller and the callee cannot
be limited to call duration only. The SPIT caller tries to reach
huge number of callee and manages to have good call duration
with the large number of callees which increase his trust and
global reputation as a whole. For example, consider a VoIP
network having 10000 users and SPIT caller makes calls to
50% of them, who managed to have call duration of 60 seconds
to 20% of called callees. In this case, although the SPIT caller
has good trust with large number of callee because of good call
duration which results caller having reputed behavior, however
caller’s structural in-balance tells story other way around. The
SPIT caller can easily by-pass call-rank system [17] by having
two SPIT accounts and exchange credentials with each other
and by-pass the VSD system [21], [22] by giving positive
feedback to SPIT identities. We believe, in addition to call
duration and user feedback, other social network features can
also be applied for computing trust and reputation of caller.
We believe that the number of repetitive calls, number of
reciprocal calls, call duration in both direction, incoming call
duration to the caller and number of unique callees to caller
can provide better insight for classifying caller as spammer
and non-spammer.
Our proposed approach makes twofold contribution. Firstly,
a direct trust and global reputation is computed using new
feature set. The direct trust and global reputation is computed
from number of outgoing partners, calling rate in both direc-
tion, and total call duration in both directions. Secondly, an
automated threshold is computed for global reputation, which
can be used by the system for classifying caller as legitimate
and non-legitimate. Our proposed work is different from other
reputation based techniques in the following way: the approach
uses structural features extracted from social network for
computing direct trust between caller and the callee, uses
power iteration method with a different initialization vector
for caller’s global reputation and automatic threshold for the
final decision. The proposed approach can be used within the
existing VoIP network without relying on users for feedback,
and without changing current SIP protocol stack and network
architecture.
The proposed work is different from other reputation based
techniques in the following way: the approach uses various
caller-callee features for computing direct trust between callers
and the callee rather than average call duration only, a power
iteration method with a different initialization vector for the
caller’s global reputation and automatic threshold for the final
decision. The proposed approach can be used within the
existing VoIP network without relying user for feedback, and
without changing current SIP protocol stacks and network
architecture.
V. PROPOSED DETECTION SCHEME
Figure below is an overview of the proposed solution for de-
tecting SPIT caller. Caller social networks are first constructed
from caller-callee past transaction from the CDR. A social
network can be represented by a directed graph where caller
are represented as nodes and call transaction are represented as
edges. After the feature extraction and pre-processing stages, a
machine learning method, such as k-means clustering, can be
used for clustering the caller in two clusters. These clusters can
then be analyzed for a set of features to categorize the cluster
into spammer or non-spammer. The remainder of this section
details the steps involved. Clustering based SPIT detection
engine consists of following steps:
1) Data Processing and Computation of Caller’s Direct
Trust: This step involve processing of raw CDRs, present
the relationship as a graph G(V,N) where V is the caller
S or the callee R identity and N is the trust relationship
between caller and the callee. Some spammers may
not be detected as spammers when considering one
feature for their analysis, but may be identified as
spammer using more features or combination of features.
Generally, the more features one uses for direct trust
computation, more likely one is to identify the non-
reputed or spammer in a network. Section V-A discusses
Fig. 1. SPIT Detection System
the approach for feature choices and their utility for the
computation of direct trust between the caller and the
callee.
2) Mapping Direct Trust into Reputation. The reputation
scores are intended to give a general idea of the caller’s
level of participation in a system. For each selected
caller we compute the reputation of caller from the
caller direct trust vector using Eigen trust algorithm. The
callers having small reputation values can be probably
considered as non-reputed caller can be stopped from
further calls. Section V-A provides the mechanism for
computation of reputation.
3) Clustering Reputation of Caller: In the training process
we cluster the caller having closed reputation values
together. Important details of clustering algorithm affect
the characteristics of cluster groups and in-turn affects
the performance of detection mechanism. In section V-B
we provide the mechanism for clustering the caller on
basis of its reputation, how many cluster to be consider
and which cluster can be consider as having suspected
spit caller.
4) On-Line Classification: In the detection process, the
calling behavior of caller is monitored and reputation
of caller is computed using direct trust value a caller
has with his interacted callees. These vectors are then
compared to the constructed clustering models to mea-
sure how the observed online behavior of caller differs.
In section V-C we provide the mechanism for online
classification of caller.
A. The Direct Trust
The direct trust presents behavior of caller towards the
callee. The legitimate and non-legitimate callers have different
level of direct trust towards their called callees and can be
computed either by getting feedback about caller from the
callee or through average call duration of caller. These features
would not behave well under few situations. For example
considering call duration as figure for high trust and reputation
would certainly blocks legitimate caller having short duration
calls and allow spammers having good duration calls. The
computation of direct trust should also consider calling rate in
both direction and number of unique callees a caller has.
These features are adopted from the fact that legitimate
callers usually have repetitive calling nature, limited number of
unique callees, have good duration with large number of called
callees and also receive good duration calls from their called
callees. However the spammer called huge number of callees,
which often results in a small duration calls to large a number
of callees and few moderate duration calls with a few callees.
In addition to this, the spammer also called a certain callee
only once and hardly receives call back from the called callee.
Considering all these features and observation, the direct trust
between caller and callee can be computed as in equation 1.
TrustSR =
CDSR × CallRateSR + CDRS × CallRateRS
POS
(1)
In 1, CD is the call duration, Call-Rate is the frequency of
interaction between caller and callee, and PO is the out-degree
of the caller S. The normalized direct trust scores ensure that
the trust scores between caller and the callee be in between 0






The increase in out-partners of the caller and having small
duration calls with a large number of called callee would
result in a small trust value for the caller with the callee.
The legitimate caller usually have small number of unique
callees [37] and mostly has repetitive calls [18] with many
of them so result in a long absolute call duration with many of
his called callees. In addition to this the legitimate caller also
receives calls from the called callees which also increase his
trust toward the callee. These features makes trust of legitimate
caller high as compared to non-legitimate caller having non-
social network and results in a small direct trust.
B. Reputation
Once a caller’s direct trust with his called callees has been
computed, his reputation is to be computed for disclosing his
nature across the network. It also plays an important role
when the callee receives call from an unknown caller and
relies on the collaboration of other network callees already
communicated with the caller. The Eigen Trust algorithm is
used for ranking the peers in a peer to peer network for
minimizing downloads from the non-legitimate peers [38].
The detection system use power iteration method for the
computation of reputation a caller across the network [17].
The better the trust caller has with large number of callees the
well reputed the caller across the network and vice versa.
The power iteration algorithm is applied to the normalized
trust value. The reputation of caller is computed as follows:
first, for each caller S the system computes a normalized direct
trust value TSR with all his callee R. Secondly, a reputation
score of caller S is computed by considering the direct trust
scores of caller S with all his callees. This way the caller’s
reputation provides the wide view about his behavior towards
all the callees the caller interacted across the network. The
global reputation GRS of caller S is computed as GRS =
(TRS)n ×GRS ; where TRS is the caller-callee direct trust
adjacency matrix, GRS is a global reputation score assigned to
the caller S at each iteration, and n is the number of users. The
initial global reputation score of caller is set to a reciprocal of
out-degree of caller S as 1/POS . The initialization of global
reputation to 1/POS would results in a small global reputation
values to the callers having high number of unique out-going
partners and high reputation scores to callers having controlled
out-degree.
The caller having high number of unique callees and small
call duration to a high number of callees would result in a
small reputation values. These reputation values would either
sent to a callee or compared with a fixed threshold for
classifying caller as a legitimate or a non-legitimate.
C. Clustering and SPIT Detection
This section presents the clustering method to be used for
classifying caller as a spammer and non-spammer.
D. Clustering
Clustering is an un-supervised machine learning approach
needed to group the data and identifies the patterns of normal
and abnormal users. The most commonly used clustering
approaches are k-mean clustering and hierarchical clustering.
These algorithms are based on notion of distance between the
data points and use to identify data points that are close to
each other.
Hierarchical Clustering compares all pairs of data points and
merges the one with the closest distance. It does not provide
a single partitioning of the data set, but instead provide an
extensive hierarchy of clusters that merge with each other
at certain distances. The k-means clustering performs in an
iterative process to form the number of specified clusters. The
k-means method first selects a set of n points called cluster
centroids as a first guess of the means of the clusters. Each
observation is assigned to the nearest centroid to form a set
of temporary clusters. The centroids are then replaced by
the cluster means, the points are reassigned, and the process
continues until no further changes occur in the clusters.
Clustering reputation data of callers faces two challenges:
first finding the number of cluster that better describes the
data points, second defining the threshold for declaring cluster
containing spam callers. A number of methods have been
proposed for finding the number of clusters that better fits
the data. The With group sum of square utilizes the distance
of data points from their centroid to quantify the dispersion
of clusters and between groups sum of squares measure the
distance of cluster centroids from the general mean of the data
to quantify how apart cluster centroids are from the mean of
data. The optimal solution is one having maximum BGSS and
smaller WGSS.
Having performed clustering, it is necessary to distin-
guish the cluster that corresponds to the legitimate and non-
legitimate behavior of caller. A simple and straight forward
approach to filter the spammers is to consider a cluster having
minimum centroid as a cluster consisting the spam caller.
This can result small true positive rate when the number of
clusters increased and high false positive when the percentage
of legitimate caller are higher than the non-legitimate caller.
A trade-off between these values are required which work
fine even when the number of clusters are increased or under
conditions when different percentages of legitimate and non-
legitimate traffic are present.
For detecting the anomalous caller we are using sum of the
square distance between the cluster having minimum centroid
values and its nearby cluster. The clusters having centroid
value near to minimum centroid cluster are used for computing
the threshold for classifying the caller as anomalous. The algo-
rithm for classifying caller as anomalous and non-anomalous
is presented in algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Detecting SPIT Caller
procedure SPITTER
InPut← Global Reputation(GR)
OutPut← SPIT or non-SPIT(1,−1)
m← kmeans(GR, k) ; k is number of clusters
cent← centroid(m)






for All caller do
if (GR[i]<threshold) then
Place Caller in SPIT List
else





In classifying new caller we need to determine the window
size of caller to be used for the reputation computation. At start
when legitimate or non-legitimate callers are introduced in a
network, they normally not to known to their friends and thus
require few fixed number of calls to be made before finally
comes to the reputation computation. The legitimate callers
usually increases their friends slow and steady however the
non-legitimate caller always tries to send as high number of
calls before blocking by the operators on manually feedback
from the callees. For newly introduced callers we allow him to
make calls to at-least 5 unique callee before finally computing
the reputation of callers. The small out-degree of caller less
than 10 cannot be constitute to caller spamming behavior and
is allowed even it results in a small reputation values. We use
the distance of the vector from the both normal and abnormal
cluster and block the caller if needed.
The deployment of this approach in a real network for spam
detection poses few challenges. After computing the reputation
and clustering the reputation of caller the challenge is how
to baseline these clusters. The caller may exhibits different
behavior in different time periods for example the caller makes
more calls during the day time and makes relatively less
number of calls in the night time similarly for the week days
and weekend. The challenge is to determine the number of
clusters as a baseline. A straight forward approach is to have a
cluster for each hour for the whole week but it would increase
the complexity of the system. Another approach is to have
single base line for the whole day and a whole week. Though
it would be less complex but it has limitation that normal
behavior during weekend or peak time may corresponds to
abnormal behavior during weekends or off peak times. An
intermediate approach is to baseline the cluster for two time
periods for week days and two time period for weekend and
public holidays.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
Call detailed records are almost always unavailable because
of privacy reasons. However, from previous work on the
analysis of call records in real telecommunication networks,
we know that the call graph exhibits a power-law distribution
with (2 < α < 3) [39], [40]. In these cases, the analysed
call graph exhibits a power-law distribution for in-degree with
α in between 1.5 and 2, and out-degree with α in between 2
and 3 [39]. In-degree is the number of unique users calling a
particular user S, and out-degree is the number of unique user
a caller S is calling to. We evaluate our proposed approach
using an extensive set of simulations based on: a power-
law model for out-degree distribution [39], [40], the Poisson
distribution for call rates [41], and the exponential distribution
for the call duration [42] [43]. We repeated all simulations for
at least ten times with different randomly generated network
sizes to determine average values. In the following subsections
we provide the description of the random data sets and the
evaluation metrics used in this study.
A. Data Set
Legitimate callers exhibit power law distribution for their
out-going partners with parameter 2 < α < 3 (cf. equation 3).
After obtaining the out-degree distribution of the caller, the
graph is created using the mechanism provided in [44].
p(OutPartnersS = x) = kx
−α (3)
Legitimate callers usually have higher calling rate within
their social group, and moderate calling rate to users outside
their social group. In our simulation setup the legitimate caller
follows the Poisson distribution for call rate with mean µ = 3





The legitimate caller has long duration calls with the callee
within his social group, and average or short duration calls
with the callee outside their social groups. In our setup,
call duration exhibits an exponential distribution with average
holding time µ = 360 seconds using equation 5.
Network Non-Spammer Spammer
Out-Degree In-Degree Avg-Duration Out-Degree In-Degree Avg-Duration
1% Spam 43.56054 42.71806 589.4619 941.7890 10.00634 143.1624
10% Spam 55.57226 46.88618 589.6070 953.0676 94.71745 289.1132




Spam True Positive (A) False Positive (B)
Not-Spam False Negative (C) True Negative (D)
TABLE II
CONFUSION MATRIX
p(CallDurationSR = x) = µe
−µx (5)
We also generated SPIT caller data by considering the social
behavior of a SPIT caller. A SPIT caller tries to reach a large
number of callees, receives a small number of incoming calls,
and has short duration incoming and outgoing calls. As such,
SPIT caller follows different distributions from the legitimate
callers. We consider both high rate and low rate SPIT callers.
The out-degree of each SPIT caller is uniformly randomly
distributed between 20% and 60% of the total number of users
in a network. The average call rate of SPIT caller is less than
4. The call duration of SPIT caller follows the exponential
distribution with mean holding time of 180 seconds.
Finally, data generated is for 10 days consisting of 10159
users and around 1 million call records.
B. Evaluation Metric
To evaluate the performance of our system, we use standard
information retrieval metrics of True Positive rate (TPR) and
accuracy (ACC). The detection rate is defined as the number of
spam call detected by the system divided by the total number
of spam caller present in the test set. The false positive rate
is defined as the total number of legitimate caller that were
incorrectly classified as SPIT caller divided by total number
of legitimate caller. Accuracy is the sum of true positive and
false positive divided by the total number of spammer and
non-spammer in a network. In order to explain these metrics,
we will make use of a confusion matrix illustrated in Table 2.
Each position in this matrix represents the number of elements
in each original class, and how they were predicted by the
classification. In Table 2, the TPR and Accuracy is computed
as TPR=A/A+C and ACC=(A+D)/(A+B+C+D)
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of propose
approach for the evaluation metrics provided in above section.
In addition to this we also discussed the effect of number
of clusters on a detection performance and detection of SPIT
caller in a real CDR.
A. Accuracy
The accurate detection system is the one which has ability
of correctly classifying the nature of caller i.e. high true pos-
itive and low false positive. Unfortunately, parameter tuning
usually causes these two metrics to increase or decrease at the
same time. We analysed the accuracy of proposed system for
different networks having different percentages of spammers
and non-spammers.
We considered three networks consisting of non-spam to
spam ratios of 100:100,100:10 and 100:1. The detection accu-
racy of our system is above 80% for all three type of networks
and for any clustering parameter figure 2. However; for the
network having small number of spammers, the approach
achieves better accuracy with a more number of clusters.
For small number of cluster, the system achieves detection
accuracy of above 95% with the increase in number of
spamming rate. For a small number of cluster and under low
spamming rate the system achieves the accuracy of around
80%. This is due to high false positive rate and due to the fact
that the few legitimate callers has small number of callees and
failed to develop strong relationship with few of them. The
false positive rate in this case increase with the increase in a
number of clusters and get stabilizes after K=6. Comparing
designed approach with call-rank, it performs better than the
call-rank which achieves the accuracy rate not more than 70%
for all the scenarios and cluster size.
The false positive can be minimized by introducing one
more stage either in the form of vocal CAPTCHA or consider-
ing interaction history features in combination with reputation
of a caller. The introduction of new stage would only affect
the false positive without having any effect on true positive or
other performance metric and system become more accurate.
B. Detection Rate
The true positive rate is the amount of spit caller that
is detected and blocked by the SPIT detection engine. The
false positive rate is the fraction of non-SPIT callers that are
mistakenly considered to be SPIT by the detection engine. The
VoIP operator would not tolerate both extreme that is allowing
large number of SPIT caller to pass and blocking higher not
number legitimate callers from calling. The operators require
these ratios maximum and minimum for not losing any revenue
of blocking legitimate caller. We have analysed the detection
rate for two parameters that are detection rate for the number
of clusters and detection rate for the amount of spammers in
a network. The approach achieves a detection rate of above
90% for high and low SPIT for any number of clusters shown
Fig. 2. SPIT Detection Accuracy for Different SPIT rate: A)SPIT Rate of 1% B)SPIT Rate of 10% C)SPIT Rate of 50%
in a figure 3 A and C. However, for the moderate rate SPIT
caller, the true positive rate decreases to 80% with increase in
the number of clusters shown in a figure 3.B. This decrease
is because in the 10% spammer network; many spammers
despite have large number of unique callees but they also have
received many calls from their called callees and have average
call duration greater than 300 seconds. These distributions are
like the distribution of legitimate caller and remain undetected
by the detection system. The true positive rate of Call-Rank
decreases with the increase in number of clusters. The false
positive rate for call-rank is better than the false positive rate
of proposed system but still achieve false positive rate less
the 5% and become stable to less the 1% with-in minimum
of 6 clusters. The analyses of system for K=2 shows that
the proposed system achieves true positive of 98% for any
type of network compared to call-rank which achieves true
positive rate of less than 90% and decreases with the increase
in number of spammers.
C. Accuracy of Different Features
There are other specific social network features that can
be used for identifying SPIT caller. We selected few social
network features for checking their significance for detection.
The detection accuracy for different social network features are
presented in Table III. The ratio of spam to non-spam caller
remain same as discussed above but due to space constraints
cluster size is fixed to 6. The highest accuracy rate of 98%
is achieved by feature communication interaction which is the
ratio of unique callee the caller has, but this also decreases
to 58% under high spamming attack. However this features
achieves better false positive of less than 1% which is better
than the false positive of our approach. But the adaptation
of this feature for Spam detection may not detect the true
spammers under high spam attack or where the spammers
make collaborative network. We also applied entropy method
to the average call duration and the caller-callee direct trust
values shown in table III as entropy 1 and entropy 2. These
two features achieve the detection accuracy greater than 70%.
These features would not perform better alone however the
combination of feature would improve the detection accuracy.
D. Addition of a New Caller
The new caller requires interaction with a number of callees
so as to develop social network and has reputation values
for future calling. In our approach the reputation computation
Network Out-Degree CI Entropy1 Entropy2
100:100 58% 98% 93% 94%
100:10 63% 98% 82% 93%
100:1 58% 58% 70% 84%
TABLE III
ACCURACY FOR DIFFERENT FEATURES FOR K=6
requires that the caller has called at-least 5 unique callees. This
threshold is because we believe a caller cannot be spammer if
he calls fewer than 5 unique callees. Once the caller reached
this threshold, the reputation of a caller can be computed and
compared with reputation score of a spit and a non-spit cluster.
The cluster having least square distance from the reputation
score of a caller would be assigned to the caller. In proposed
approach the reputation of a caller decreases with the increase
in a number of its unique callee unless the caller has long
duration and incoming calls from their called callees. Usually
the newly introduced spit callers would not be able to managed
high duration calls to a large number of callees and also do
not receive calls from their called callee, so result in a small
reputation values. These suspected callers would be blocked
by the system at earliest and if missed on first attempt these
would be blocked on second attempt because of decrease in a
reputation values with the passage of time.
E. Complexity of Algorithm
Our design algorithm consist of three phases that are: com-
putation of direct trust and reputation, applying k-means and
detecting the anomalous caller in a network. The complexity
of trust is O(n2) and reputation converges in fewer than 6
iteration for the network size of 10000 users. The complexity
of the K-means clustering algorithm is O(K n t) where K is the
number of clusters, n is the number of objects to be classified,
and t the number of iterations which depends on the initial
classification of the objects and the feature value distribution.
The threshold computation and classification phase has the
complexity of O(k) where k are the number of clusters.
Applying the detection to new caller has O(k) complexity for
detection.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a novel approach for SPIT
detection and filtering for VoIP networks. Our approach uses
a social network features to compute the caller’s trust and
Fig. 3. Detection Rate : A)SPIT Rate of 1% B)SPIT Rate of 10% C)SPIT Rate of 50%
reputation across the network. The k-means clustering method
is used for computing the threshold for distinguishing SPIT
caller from the non-SPIT caller. We evaluated the system on
three type of synthetic networks. Experimental measurements
demonstrate that the system can achieve high accuracy for
the network with high number of spammers. Overall, the true
positive remains above 90% for all type of network; however,
the false positive rate can be high for the network having
small number of spammers. We argued and showed that this
false positive rate can be improved with the addition of one
more stage without affecting true positive rate. Moreover, our
proposed approach and solution does not require any feedback
from the caller or callee, and therefore protecting the privacy of
the users. As shown, our proposed system can be deployed in a
VoIP operator’s network for SPIT caller identification without
involving caller or the callee. In addition the system does not
require any modifications to the client telephony equipment,
SIP message stack or operator’s network architecture.
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